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0 Introduction 
In recent years, the market for catastrophic risk has considerably grown and the insurance, 
reinsurance and financial markets contribute now to hedge more natural hazards than ever 
(Froot, 2001). Structural reforms of the States' subsidizations have been particularly important in 
the agricultural sector and their aim is always the same: the introduction and the development of 
private insurance and the encouragement for a multirisk coverage. 
 
If we consider the catastrophic insurance problem from the farm’s point of view, we notice that 
the most studied criterion is their solvency. In this domain, literature mainly refers to insurance 
companies (Zanjani, 2002, Kelly and Kleffner, 2003). This leads to the question of their 
efficiency to propose products adapted to insurance demand. 
 
In facts, natural hazards mainly concern human beings and the agricultural sector. As a sign of 
their vulnerability, they both benefit from a State’s intervention in most developed countries 
when a catastrophe occurs. This implication of the public authorities has become necessary due 
to market imperfections in catastrophe risk sharing (Niehaus, 2002). Moreover, it encourages the 
development of policies, which will fit the new needs for coverage. 
 
With human beings, the major preoccupation comes from the material’s exposure and housing 
in particular. According to recent surveys with large French insurance companies, this stake is 
by far the most important in financial terms. It also uniformly concerns all types of activities, 
including agriculture. We notice that literature is abundant on this subject and considers the 
problems from the points of view of the insurers (Choi and Weiss, 2005), the insured (Grace et 
al., 2004) or the market (Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2005). 
 
Conversely, literature is quite scarce about the financial aspects of specific agricultural 
insurance mainly for the so-called crop insurance. We can refer to the market studies realized by 
Wang and Zang (2003). Harrington and Niehaus (1999), also cited by Puelz (1999), insist on the 
specificities of each business, which determines the needs for tailor-made insurance. If we 
follow their reasoning, agricultural risk management should be treated in the same way than 
agricultural financial management. As presented by Harrington and Niehaus (1999), this 
supposes to introduce a wide range of financial parameters relative to the size of the business, its 
cash ratio, its financial distress and the activities’ structure. Then we can use these financial 
criteria in addition to traditional agricultural ones in order to establish the decision rules that 
lead farmers to insure. The paper is mainly centered on this question. 
 
Literature devoted to crop insurance is not specifically oriented towards financial issues. Among 
the explicative variables for crop insurance subscription, we find the farm size, the debt-to-asset 
ratio (also known as the financial leverage) and the age and education of the farmer. However, 
these recurrent indicators often restrict the field of potential dependant variables. For example, 
no study proposes to detail meteorological variables whereas the final yield essentially depends 
on the climate. Among the potential variables, precipitations are the most frequently cited (Van 
Asseldonk et al., 2002, Blank et al., 1996). Similarly, the financial variables other than the debts 
are left aside. In some studies, the turnover or the farmer’s income is included in the analysis 
(Mishra et al., 2003, Van Asseldonk et al., 2002, Blank et al., 1996), as well as the subsidization 
level (Glauber, 2004, Mishra et al., 2003). Otherwise, the different risk management options are 
taken into account, for instance the use of chemical products (Serra et al., 2003), irrigation or 
activities diversification (Serra et al., 2003, Blank et al., 1996, Goodwin, 1993). We try to be as      3
exhaustive as possible by integrating in our analysis a set of diversified variables relative to all 
characteristics of the farms: individual, financial and meteorological parameters. 
 
From a geographical point of view, previous researches mainly refer to the United States case 
(for instance, Knight and Coble, 1997). This country has developed overtime (in 1980, 1994 and 
2000) a stronger crop insurance system (Glauber, 2004). Nevertheless, some countries of the 
southern European Union have also successfully developed integrated insurance programs 
(Garrido and Zilberman, 2007). Nowadays, in these most advanced systems, insurance policies 
subscription reaches about 50% to 60% of eligible farms. 
 
The French case is particularly interesting because crop insurance has considerably been 
expanding since the 2004 reform. In the past, only hail and storms were really covered because 
their characteristics made them insurable without any subsidies. All the other hazards were 
covered using a national guarantee fund. Since 2004, an experimental test of multi-peril crop 
insurance is operated at the national level. It involves both the State and historically focused on 
agriculture private insurers. Although such a reform completely changed the coverage of natural 
events in French agriculture, it has received a very superficial treatment and literature is quite 
scant on this subject. 
 
We also consider the problem on a national scale in order to get a representative overview of the 
situation. This approach is facilitated by the data of the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN-RICA). Moreover, global criteria are accepted by all types of studies, recent or not 
(Sherrick et al. 2004, Serra et al., 2003, Goodwin, 1993). 
 
Then, the experimental scheme of this paper allows examining three major concerns: Are 
financial, individual and catastrophic characteristics of farms subscribing crop insurance policies 
determinants to insurance decision? Does the subscription of such policies improve the financial 
wealth and the performances of the firms? Are results consistent along the observation period 
overlapping the implementation of multi-peril crop insurance in France?  
 
The outline of the paper is organized as follows. In a first section, we analyze the agricultural 
insurance system in France whose current evolution is captured by our data. In a second section, 
we consider the theoretical and empirical settings of the study. Sections three to five examine 
the three main questions addressed by the paper according to our methodology: first, the cross-
sectional analysis allows discriminating between the insured farms and non-insured firms. 
Second the longitudinal tests show the change in the different variables between both sub-
groups. Finally, the logistic regressions accurately examine the importance of financial variables 
in the insurance decision. The paper’s most salient conclusions are summarized in section six. 
 
1  The agricultural insurance system in France 
 
The French insurance system in agriculture has been developed more than forty years ago under 
the supervision of the State. Until 1964, there did not exist any integrated coverage system in 
France. After a series of droughts, a public indemnity mechanism called the National Guarantee 
Fund for farming calamities (FNGCA) is created. It is equitably financed by the Government 
Budget and by taxes on compulsory standard insurance policies subscribed by farmers. It covers 
farming calamities defined as “non insurable damages of exceptional importance due to 
abnormally intense variations of a natural hazard”. During its existence, losses of crops due to 
frost or drought indemnified by the FNGCA have accounted for some 75% of total indemnities 
accorded by the Fund.       4
Among insurable risks, hail is historically the main covered risk and it has been partially 
subsidized for arboriculture, the most exposed activity. The occurrence of numerous hail 
episodes in the arboricultural regions between 1990 and 1995 has pushed insurers to raise the 
premia and the deductibles in the fruit and vegetable sector. These increases have helped 
producing a vicious circle of adverse selection and of tariff increases. Consequently, insured 
farmers were the less affected by hail. This situation was inducing a financial transfer from 
lesser risk farming operations (large crops), to those carrying a more significant risk 
(arboriculture). 
 
Facing these constraints, an opportunity for the development of global insurance has been given 
at the end of the 1990s. First, an agricultural agreement of the World Trade Organization 
allowed classifying public sector aid to insurance (“Green box”) under certain conditions. 
Second, the development of aid to insurance in North America (US, Canada) and Southern 
Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece) provided some experiences. Third, there was a global trend 
towards the liberalization of agricultural policy, which was likely to increase agricultural prices 
volatility and therefore the exposure of farmers to natural hazards. 
 
In order to develop private insurance, the French Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries decided 
to continue subsidizing traditional hail insurance and the FNGCA. Moreover, it extended its 
subsidies to combined guaranties and weather multirisk insurance in the 2002 Finance Law. 
New policies should combine hail and frost guarantees for fruits and vineyards and propose 
weather multirisk insurance for crops on the stalk. The following Table 1 details the insured 
risks and their scope in 2005 for each kind of crops.  
 
Insurable crops  Insured risks  Scope 
Corn and large assimilated 
crops other than found below 
 Hail 
 Weather multirisk 
55% of national surface 
25% of the surface 
Vineyards   Hail 
 Weather multirisk 
60% of national surface 
0.5% of national surface 
Fruits and garden vegetables   Hail 
 Weather multirisk 
62% of national surface 
1.2% of national surface 
Tobacco    Weather multirisk  100 % of national surface
 
     Source: French Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
Table 1 – Main crops, proposed policies and their scope 
 
For year 2005, about 20% of farmers have subscribed 57,900 multirisk contracts. This 
represents an amount of 3,4 million insured hectares, €3 billion insured capital and €82 million 
premia, whose €50 million are subsidized and €17.4 million come from various State helps. 
Until 2008, this system remains experimental but it will probably be extended after this period
1. 
 
                                                 
1 As a consequence of French elections, the new system modalities are still not defined in March 2008.      5
2  Theoretical and Empirical Settings 
 
As we already pointed out in the introduction, the experimental scheme of this paper allows 
examining major concerns about the main determinants to insurance decision that lead farms to 
insure against crop risk. To answer these questions, we detail in the followings subsections our 
variables and the main assumptions of our model. 
2.2 The data 
The study uses a survey of farmers in France belonging to the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN). Data are accounted for each year from a representative sample of farms, whose size 
can be considered as commercial. We use a set of data selected through three criteria: 
localization, economic size and farms major productions. Within the original database, we only 
select farms that have continuously appertained to the sample from 2002 to 2005. We also 
restrict the analysis to farms that may be concerned with crop insurance. Finally, our sample 
includes 4,700 farms. 
 
In the following subsections, we detail the main explanatory variables that enter in the analysis. 
We choose to detail a wide range of potential factors including financial and meteorological 
variables, often missing in the literature. 
2.2.1 Insurance 
For the purpose of our analysis, we selected a variable indicating the eventual subscription of a 
private crop insurance policy. This can be found only for the years 2002 to 2005, which 
delimitates our temporal analysis. For the same period, the database also gives the amount of 
perceived indemnities. Thus, our study covers the time of crop insurance regime reform in 
France. Its effects are marginal during years 2002 and 2003 because the system was only 
experimented in some places. In 2004 and 2005, nearly all the farmers who subscribed a crop 
insurance policy against hail were offered the extension to other risks
2. Moreover, the range of 
covered crops is also extending over the years. 
2.2.2 Financial and economic indicators 
Although neglected in crop insurance literature, the farmers' financial wealth has to be 
considered as an essential parameter in the decision to insure (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
The idea is that the largest businesses are more willing to cover their potential losses because 
their stakes are higher. Moreover, we can infer the indebted farms are also asking for a greater 
coverage. Thus, the financial leverage should appear as positively correlated with the use of 
crop insurance. 
 
                                                 
2 For the leading insurer, which trusts 90% of this new market, guaranteed risks are: sunburn, excess of water, 
excess of humidity, excess of temperature, frost, hail, floods, hard raining, excess of snow, drought, storm and heat 
whirl.      6
For the purpose of our analysis, we consider the main economical and financial indicators:  
- Annual turnover, in €uros. 
- Invested capital, in €uros. 
- Financial leverage = Net financial debts / Shareholder’s equity. 
- Cash disposals = Cash and equivalents / Current asset. 
- Cash ratio = (Cash + Marketable securities) / Current liabilities. 
- Return on equity (ROE) = Net income / Shareholders' equity. 
- Return on capital employed (ROCE) = Operating income / Invested capital. 
- Revenue per are, in €uros per are.  
 
Such indicators, which are strong references in finance, should provide a clear and unbiased 
view of the financial wealth of the agricultural firms. 
2.2.3 Individual indicators 
In the analysis, we take into account standard individual indicators for the farm manager such as 
its age, sex and education level. We can also consider whether a single farmer or a group of 
farmers exploits the farm. One can think that insured farmers are more educated and have a 
greater experience than non-insured one. Otherwise, young farmers may be more sensitive to 
new risk management products as they can receive more subsidies for their insurance policies. 
2.2.4 Agricultural indicators 
Among the agricultural area indicators, we consider the total, cultivated and irrigated surfaces. 
We also take into account the farm’s cultures portfolio and its technical economic-activity 
specialization (vegetables, cattle, or both). In fact, the diversification of the activities is a way to 
stabilize the annual turnover of the farm. Then, it can be assimilated to a substitute to specific 
insurance products. Irrigation is also perceived as a mean to hedge crop risk because it reduces 
soil moisture and desiccation, and increases yield return. On the contrary, biological agriculture 
seems to be a more risky activity. 
2.2.5 Geographic and Weather indicators 
The FADN database offers direct ways to determine the location and altitude of the farm and if 
it is located in a less favored area. Then, we can associate to each place different weather 
indicators
3 that are considered as relevant by literature. We use the annual mean temperature, 
the annual cumulated precipitations and the annual cumulated hours of sun. Starting from these 
original variables, we convert them by taking the square deviation from their average
4 for each 
year. Then, we can capture the farmers' sensitivity to excessive variations of the climate. 
 
We can assume that farmers are risk-averse against excessive variations and that the most 
exposed will subscribe crop policies. On the contrary, adverse selection effects may put them 
out-of-the-market as a consequence of catastrophic results for the insurance company. One can 
also consider that after a major event like drought or excessive rainfall, the farmers will be more 
willing to insure their crops. In contrast, the lack of catastrophic events may not be an incentive.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Data come from the French National Institute for Agronomic Research weather stations, in partnership with 
Météo France. We display the indicators for each place taking into account the region and the altimetry.  
4 Average is based on the ten years before the decision to insure.      7
2.3 Summary of the main assumptions 
Considering the former variables and their potential scope on insurance, we can formulate some 
assumptions that are tested in the paper: 
 
H1: As previously argued, the size and the wealth of farms are proxies for their exposition to 
crop risk. We expect the largest businesses are more willing to get an insurance coverage. The 
effect should be captured through standard financial criteria: the annual turnover, invested 
capital, as well as the financial and economic returns. In agriculture, the correlation should be 
the same between insurance, the cultivated surface and the "crop portfolio".  
 
H2: We also guess that risk-averse farmers should more prone to insure. Criteria for risk 
aversion can be found in the number of cultivated crop and the irrigated surface. The 
meteorological variables enter in the frame because abnormal variations of the weather, whether 
negative or positive, may lead the farmers to insure more. Experienced and more educated 
farmers would also be more interested in coverage. 
 
H3: We finally presume there exists a fidelity effect in crop insurance: farmers who have already 
subscribed an insurance policy the year before remain insured. The effect should be more 
pronounced for farmers who have already received indemnities. 
 
3  The characteristics of farms subscribing crop insurance contracts 
 
In this section, we look for the fundamental differences between the agricultural firms: the ones 
that insure themselves and the others. 
3.1 Methodology 
According to our experimental scheme and to our sample, we can make significant distinctions 
between the farms depending on whether they are insured or not. At first, we look at some 
summary statistics. Then, to confirm the results, we use the Mann-Whitney’s nonparametric 
statistical test. 
3.2 Summary statistics 
In order to offer a first view of the situation of insured and non-insured farms, we detail 
hereafter in Table 2 some summary statistics for the years 2002 to 2005. The variables are 
organized in order to take into account the main characteristics of the farm: agricultural, 
financial and meteorological. The observed mean and median are reliable indicators due to the 
significant number of farms (4,700) observed during four years in our sample. 
 
The results are quite similar comparing the mean and the median of the two subgroups. This is 
true for the individual, agricultural and meteorological (excepted for the temperature) variables. 
We clearly observe that insured farms are bigger than non-insured one (financial and 
agricultural sizes) and in a better wealth (financial leverage, cash flow). Insured farms are also 
the most diversified in terms of cultures and they use more irrigation, which is a sign of risk-
aversion. Moreover, we can see that weather conditions are more “extreme” for insured farms. 
      8
 
Variables Mean  Median 
Category Detail  All  Insured  Non-
insured  All Insured  Non-
insured 
Insured (prob.)  0.44 10 0  1 0 Insurance 
Indemnity (in €)  663.57 1214.67 228.69 0  0 0
Age (in years)  46.44 46.21 46.62 47 46 47 Individual 
indicators  Sex (1=Man)  0.93 0.94 0.93 1  1  1
Total area (in ares
5)  9388 11052 8075 7645  9270 6655
Cultivated area (in ares)  8807 10388 7559 7160  8616 6166 Surface 
Irrigated area (in ares)  601 925 346 0  0  0
Cultures  Number of cultures  6.60 7.19 6.14 7  7 6
Mean temperature  0.23 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.18
Cumulated precipitations  19803 21424 18525 10692  11273 10501
Meteo 
indicators 
(avg. dev.)  Cumulated hours of sun  32625 34529 31123 5100  5100  5100
Annual turnover (in €)  213456 221599 207031 167045  177889 158417
Invested capital (in €)  444239 467114 426188 367825  386761 352816
Financial leverage  0.59 0.55 0.62 0.33  0.33 0.32
Cash disposals  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cash ratio  0.48 0.46 0.49 0.18 0.18 0.19
Return on equity  0.41 0.38 0.43 0.27  0.29 0.26





RPA (in € per are)  43.23 17.84 63.26 3.24  4.37 2.31
 
Legend in rows: in yellow, the highest values for the mean and the median. 
Table 2 - Summary statistics for crop insurance use (all years) 
One can notice that there remain some differences between the mean and the median, which 
means that distributions of the different indicators’ values are rather different. This phenomenon 
mainly concerns the financial indicators (financial leverage, ROE, revenue per are). To confirm 
these results and provide more interpretations, we consider now a cross-sectional analysis.  
3.3 Cross-sectional analysis 
Looking at summary statistics underlined some differences in the distribution of some variables 
between the insured and the non-insured. To compare these two groups, which are not of the 
same size, we perform for each variable a Mann-Whitney test. In each case, the result is given 
by the p-value. A small one indicates that the difference between the two groups is significant 
and consequently that medians are statistically different. The sign of the U-statistic indicates the 
direction of the relationship. Results are provided in Appendix 1 for each variable and for 2002 
to 2005. We can conclude whether the difference is significant or not between the two groups 
and over the years. Our first control variable indicates that the insured perceive more 
indemnities than the non-insured, which is a sufficient incentive to get insured. Moreover, it 
may justify the increasing success of crop insurance in France. 
 
Among the financial variables, the turnover and the invested capital are significantly higher for 
the insured during the four years. It is also true for the ROCE. The financial leverage is also 
higher for the insured but this effect is only significant in 2005. Conversely, there’s no 
difference between the groups according to the cash ratio and the ROE. Considering now the 
                                                 
5 1 are = 0.0247 acre      9
agricultural variables, we notice a clear and positive difference between the groups: the insured 
produce more culture varieties on a higher (irrigated) area. Moreover, the product per surface-
unit is clearly higher for the insured. 
 
The meteorological variables provide more surprising results. We could suppose that the insured 
would suffer from a wider range of climatic conditions from one year to another. In fact, this 
assumption is not verified as the sign of the difference changes over the years. The associated 
coefficients become simultaneously positive and very significant in 2004. This is not surprising 
if we consider that 2003 was in France a hard year with scorching heats and a serious deficit of 
rain. These extreme conditions may have justified a greater need for insurance on the affected 
areas. It seems that the effect is completely opposite in 2005, as 2004 was quite a normal year.  
 
We also notice that the values of the different tests globally increase in 2005, compared to 2004, 
for each variable. This occurs at the moment when crop insurance is generalized from hail to 
multi-peril. It probably means that the effects noticed above are reinforced after the introduction 
of additional coverage. Such an effect has already been observed during the various reforms of 
the US crop insurance regime (Serra et al., 2003). 
 
4.  Situation over the years of farms that subscribed crop insurance policies 
 
In this section, we look for the situation of agricultural businesses that decide to insure for a 
given year. The idea is to observe whether the situation of the farms significantly changes when 
they get insured. The comparison is done with farms that do not insure. 
4.1 Methodology 
Our sample can be exploited during four years, which means we can observe the evolution of 
the farms with two possible references in 2003 and 2004. Starting from these two points, we can 
consider an insured farmer on year 0 and look at his situation in year -1 and year +1. 
Consequently, farmers insured in 0 may not be insured in -1 and/or +1. Then, we compare the 
evolution of our variables over the years between the insured and the non-insured. For instance, 
will insured in 0 have significantly higher debts in +1 than non-insured at the same time? The 
same reasoning applies for all variables. 
4.2 Longitudinal analysis 
The first step of the analysis is to select a year and to divide the sample according to whether 
farmers are insured or not. As we still compare two unpaired subpopulations over the years, we 
perform for each variable a Mann-Whitney test. In each case, the interpretation is given by the 
value of the test and the p-value. A small one indicates that the difference between the two 
groups is significant and consequently that medians are statistically different. The sign of the Z-
statistic indicates the direction of the relationship. The results of the longitudinal analysis are 
provided in Appendix 2 for each variable and for each year of reference, 2003 or 2004. Then, 
we can conclude if the difference is significant or not between the two groups and the scope of 
time. 
 
We notice that financial variables are among the most significant. Let’s consider first the 
amount of indemnities. We first clearly note that this variable is always significant when the 
analysis is centered on 2003, while it is never the case when centered on 2004. The comparison      10
of the situation between 2002 and 2003 leads to a significant and positive value: this means that 
the amount of indemnities during the period increases much for farmer who will insure in 2003 
than for those who won’t insure. Between 2003 and 2004, it is the contrary, as indicated by the 
negative sign. This means that the variation of the indemnities is strangely more favorable to 
farmers who didn’t insure the year before. Over the period 2002-2004, the balance remains in 
favor of the insured, which seems normal, considering the insurance’s aim is to provide more 
wealth for the subscriber. Unfortunately, we cannot perform the same comparison for the years 
2003 to 2005, as none of the statistics is significant. 
 
Few variables present a uniform sign along the different studied periods. It is the case of the 
financial leverage. It seems that the debts increase much faster for the insured over the period. It 
is also the case for the cultivated surface. Then, insured farmers increase their risk by expanding 
their cultures and their debts. This fact is corroborated by observing the cash variable between 
2003 and 2005, whose variation is negatively more important for the insured (at the 10% level). 
This result is also in phase with literature (Knight and Coble, 1997). We also notice that the 
revenue per surface-unit increases much more for the insured once the private insurance system 
is launched (after 2004). 
 
Meteorological variables present significant results and we find again the mechanism detailed in 
the cross-section analysis. Until 2004, the insured bear more excess (negative or positive) 
temperature, precipitations and sunlight. Between 2004 and 2005, it is the contrary. This fact 
confirms the increase of the insurance subscriptions in 2004 by farmers who suffered from the 
2004 climatic accident. 
 
The other variables cannot be correctly interpreted, whether because they are not significant or 
their sign changes depending on the focus on 2003 or 2004. We can deduce that the effects of 
insurance are quite ambivalent depending on the study period. After have been insured in 2003, 
farmers perceive less indemnities but increase their size, turnover and return, compared to the 
non-insured. For farmers insured in 2004, the benefits procured by insurance are not evident, 
whilst the financial and agricultural indicators are more favorable to the non-insured. 
 
5.  Revisiting the main determinants of crop insurance 
 
Our analysis introduces two major focuses on the financial wealth of the farms and on 
meteorological parameters, often neglected in crop insurance literature. We shall now test the 
impact of these parameters on insurance purchasing. 
5.1 Methodology 
Following previous analyses on the demand of crop insurance (see e.g. Glauber, 2004, or 
Garrido and Zilberman, 2007), we assume insurance purchase is influenced by a certain number 
of farm characteristics. The dependant variable is a dummy indicating whether the farmer is 
insured or not for the given year. We enter in the analysis the entire variables described above. 
  
To capture the impact of a previous subscription, we introduce two lagged variables indicating if 
the farm was insured the year before and the amount of the perceived indemnities
6. In order to 
extend our previous analyses, we also wish to capture the influence of the initial education level 
of the farmer and the location of the farm. 
                                                 
6 These data are only available for years 2003, 2004 and 2005.      11
 
For the purpose of our study, we first estimated a series of logistics regressions with the same 
variables for each year of our sample. Then, we estimate a global model based on data for the 
years 2003 to 2005  
5.2 Regressions year by year 
This type of comparison is inspired from Serra et al. (2003) in order to measure changes in 
demand for crop insurance over the years. We notice that the same variables remain significant 
over the years: for instance, the fact to have been insured the year before considerably increases 
the probability to insure the current year. Such a result has already been noticed by the insurers, 
whose efforts are concentrated on the search for new customers, rather than on the conservation 
of their customers. The perception of indemnities is also a key criterion: farmers insure if they 
increase their probability to perceive more indemnities. Financial variables are surprisingly not 
significant at all compared to agricultural ones: cultivated and irrigated surfaces and the number 
of different vegetable cultures, which have a positive effect on the decision to insure. Farms that 
are centered on vegetables are also more willing to insure. The weather is only significant when 
an extreme event occurred the year before 
5.3 Global logistic regression 
When merging the samples for years 2003 to 2005, we get a new database with 15,820 
observations. Then, we estimate a logistic regression with the same parameters. The results are 
given in Appendix 3. 
 
Among the significant variables, we still find the impact of previous insurance subscription and 
indemnities. The age has a negative influence on the policy subscription, which is in accordance 
with the efforts made by the French government to subsidize insurance policies for young 
farmers. The agricultural variables referring to the cultivated surface and the number of cultures 
are also significant but their impact is quite modest on the probability of subscription. The 
technical specialization of the farm has also a significant influence on insurance: farms whose 
main activity is the production of vegetables are more exposed and then they are more willing to 
get insured. 
 
The financial variables are globally non significant and the global regression does not confirm 
some results shown with longitudinal and transversal analysis. There is only one significant 
variable: the revenue per surface-unit, which strangely tends to decrease the probability to 
insure. In the same way, meteorological variables are not significant, except for the 
precipitations, but the coefficient is negligible. In fact, their effect is much more visible year by 
year. Moreover, precipitations seem to be the most reliable weather indicator in the decision to 
insure.  
 
Finally, the altimetry also has an influence on insurance purchasing. The interpretation of the 
coefficients indicates that a location between 300 and 600 meters increases the probability to 
insure compared to farms located at a lower altitude. The relationship is opposite for farms 
located over 600 meters. In fact, the great cultures, which constitute the majority of insured 
crops, are preferentially located in plains. Moreover, for biological reasons, arboriculture is also 
located at an altitude less than 600 meters. 
      12
6. Conclusion 
 
Our multi-level study was designed to test three main assumptions. The main results are recalled 
hereafter according to our starting hypotheses: 
 
H1: As expected, the largest agri-businesses are more likely to insure than smaller one. 
Moreover, the full set of tests proves that the agricultural size (measured with the cultivated and 
irrigated surfaces and with the crop portfolio) is much more important than the financial size in 
the decision to insure. This result is confirmed with the cross-sectional and the longitudinal 
analyses, as well as the regressions. Variables referring to the financial size (turnover, invested 
capital) and to the performance (ROE, ROCE, revenue per surface-unit) only appear as 
positively significant with the cross-sectional analysis. 
 
H2: We also notice that our criteria for risk-aversion increase the probability to insure. All tests 
and regressions prove the positive correlation between insurance, irrigation and the diversity of 
the crop portfolio. The meteorological variables seem to have a more debatable effect. One 
could expect that abnormal variations of temperature, precipitations and/or sunlight would 
increase the probability of insurance. In fact, these indicators are significant when they are 
linked to an extreme event, such as the 2003 scorching heat. In addition, the effect of financial 
variables is also ambiguous, despite the financial leverage significantly increases when farmers 
get insured. 
 
H3: We finally observe a fidelity to insurance as farmers who have already subscribed an 
insurance policy or who have received indemnities the year before are clearly more willing to 
insure again. Once a farmer is insured, he remains insured. 
 
Further research should investigate more localized farms, in order to precise this global analysis. 
Moreover, the increasing development of French crop insurance will offer new opportunities to 
study the evolutions of crop insurance demand factors. In fact, the introduction of new insured 
hazards, as well as the launching of new products, may modify the actual determinants of crop 
insurance purchase within the next years. It would also be of a great interest to give a theoretical 
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V.S.  Temp. Precipit. Sunlight 
  V  -1.00  0.00 18066.00  24173.78 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 1.93 2.48  1.00 2417.00 2256.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9698.40  1261.43 
2002  U 1.75  -13.32 -5.20  -4.13 -0.16 1.02 0.95 1.61 -4.17 -5.79 -11.63  -10.43 -12.41 -12.55 -7.16 -5.39 -1,77 1,10  0,59 
  P 0.08  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.88 0.31 0.34 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,08 0,27  0,56 
  V  0.00  0.00 15353.23  30844.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 2.10 2.55  1.00 2384.00 2307.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -330.26  -532.67 
2003  U  1.47  -16.13 -4.98  -5.28 0.90 0.15 -0.05 2.31 -4.04 -6.34 -11.82  -10.35 -12.40 -12.53 -7.67 -5.88 -1,20 4,18 -1,24 
  P  0.14  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.37 0.88 0.96 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,23 0,00 0,22 
  V  -1.00  0.00 22059.00  35087.71 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 2.06 2.43  1.00 2697.00 2574.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13301.09  10295.36 
2004  U  2.36  -15.08 -6.07  -4.97 -0.98 -0.19 0.15 -0.41 -5.03 -6.29 -11.49  -10.10 -13.14 -13.30 -6.20 -4.22 -5,33 -14,26  -5,39 
  P  0.02  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.33 0.85 0.88 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0,00  0,00 
  V  -1.00  0.00 23310.58  43116.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 2.22 2.65  1.00 2890.00 2726.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -407.07  0.00 
2005  U 1.79  -17.72 -6.38  -5.55 -2.56 0.41 0.31 1.18 -5.97 -8.21 -14.06  -12.64 -14.07 -14.14 -6.67 -4.14 2,87 8,42  2,39 
  P 0.07  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.68 0.76 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0,00  0,02 
 
Legend in columns: Age = Age of the farmer (years), Indem. = Crop insurance indemnities (€), Turnover = Turnover (€), Inv. Cap. = Invested Capital (€), Fin. Lev. = Financial 
Leverage, Cash Disp. = Cash disposals, Cash Ratio, ROE = Return on Equity, ROCE = Return On Capital Employed, RPA = Revenue per are (€ / are), RPCA = Revenue per cultivated 
are (€ / are), Nb. Veg. = Number of varieties of cultivated crops, Tot. Surf. = Total surface of the farm (ares), Veg. Surf. = Cultivated surface of the farm (ares), Irr. Surf. = Irrigated 
surface of the farm (ares), I.S. / V.S. = Irrigated surface / Cultivated surface, Temp., Precipit. and Sunlight = Mean square variations of temperature, precipitations and sunlight. 
 
Legend in rows: V = Value of the difference between the non-insured and the insured, U = Mann-Whitney's U-test and P = P-value (variables significant at the 5% level are colored). 
 
Interpretation: A positive sign means that the value of the parameter is higher for the non-insured than for the insured, and vice versa. 
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2003  Z  -0.09 5.13  -1.98  1.26  -0.39 1.11 2.50 -0.54 -1.19 -5.12 -6.10  0.59 -0.32 0.21 0.56 0.08 0.50 -1.88 -0.65 
-2002  p  0.93 0.00  0.05  0.21  0.70 0.27 0.01 0.59 0.24 0.00 0.00  0.55 0.75 0.84 0.58 0.94 0.62 0.06 0.52 
(-1,0)  N1  2055 2055  2055  2055  2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055  2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 
 N 2  2645 2645  2645  2645  2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645  2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 
                                        
2004  Z  -0.99 -1.45  3.71  1.58  3.41 -0.37 -0.67 3.08 0.28 5.39 5.98  0.95 0.86 2.08 -0.76 -1.79 2.44 8.38 6.37 
-2003  p  0.32 0.15  0.00  0.11  0.00 0.71 0.50 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00  0.34 0.39 0.04 0.45 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 
(0,+1)  N1  2055 2055  2055  2055  2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055  2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 
 N 2  2645 2645  2645  2645  2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645  2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 
  
                                     
2004  Z  -0.60 3.21  1.03  2.21  1.63 0.80 -0.06 1.97 -1.08 1.77 1.07  1.52 0.31 1.96 0.55 -1.10 5.44 6.21 2.66 
-2002  p  0.55 0.00  0.30  0.03  0.10 0.42 0.95 0.05 0.28 0.08 0.28  0.13 0.76 0.05 0.58 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.01 
(-1,+1)  N1  2055 2055  2055  2055  2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055  2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 2055 
 N 2  2645 2645  2645  2645  2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645  2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 2645 
 


















V.S.  Temp. Precipit. Sunlight 
2004  Z  -2.03 -0.22  3.71  0.62  3.14 -0.32 -0.74 3.35 0.28 4.80 5.23  0.91 0.41 2.04 -0.84 -1.40 1.78 9.14  8.30 
-2003  p  0.04 0.83  0.00  0.53  0.00 0.75 0.46 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00  0.36 0.68 0.04 0.40 0.16 0.08 0.00  0.00 
(-1,0)  N1  2125 2125  2125  2125  2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125  2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125  2125 
 N 2  2575 2575  2575  2575  2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575  2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575  2575 
  
                                     
2005  Z  0.57 0.10  -4.71  0.83  3.40 -1.73 -1.19 -2.34 -0.90 21.24 2.53  -28.68 0.46 -1.76 -1.75 -2.14 -9.40 -11.42  -5.75 
-2004  p  0.57 0.92  0.00  0.41  0.00 0.08 0.23 0.02 0.37 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.65 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00  0.00 
(0,+1)  N1  2125 2125  2125  2125  2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125  2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125  2125 
 N 2  2575 2575  2575  2575  2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575  2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575  2575 
  
                                     
2005  Z  -0.73 0.05  -0.76  1.07  5.30 -1.85 -1.74 0.73 -0.41 22.19 8.02  -28.40 0.42 0.09 -1.63 -2.20 -3.52 -5.64  -0.98 
-2003  p  0.46 0.96  0.45  0.29  0.00 0.06 0.08 0.46 0.68 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.68 0.93 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00  0.33 
(-1,+1)  N1  2125 2125  2125  2125  2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125  2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125 2125  2125 
 N 2  2575 2575  2575  2575  2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575  2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575 2575  2575 
 
Legend in columns: Age = Age of the farmer (years), Indem. = Crop insurance indemnities (€), Turnover = Turnover (€), Inv. Cap. = Invested Capital (€), Fin. Lev. = Financial 
Leverage, Cash Disp. = Cash disposals, Cash Ratio, ROE = Return on Equity, ROCE = Return On Capital Employed, RPA = Revenue per are (€ / are), RPCA = Revenue per cultivated 
are (€ / are), Nb. Veg. = Number of varieties of cultivated crops, Tot. Surf. = Total surface of the farm (ares), Veg. Surf. = Cultivated surface of the farm (ares), Irr. Surf. = Irrigated 
surface of the farm (ares), I.S. / V.S. = Irrigated surface / Cultivated surface, Temp., Precipit. and Sunlight = Mean square variations of temperature, precipitations and sun. 
 
Legend in rows: Z = Mann-Whitney's Z-test (adjusted), P = P-value (variables significant at the 5% level are colored), N1 = Number of insured and N2 = Number of non-insured. 
 
Interpretation: A positive sign means that the value of the parameter increases faster for the insured than for the non-insured over the period, and vice versa. 
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Indem. -1   0.386  0.080   4.82  0.000   0.229   0.543    1.471  0.118 
Insured -1   3.997  0.055  72.64  0.000   3.889   4.105  54.420  2.994 
Age  -0.008  0.003  -2.26  0.024  -0.014  -0.001    0.992  0.003 
Sex  -0.080  0.109  -0.73  0.463  -0.293   0.133    0.923  0.100 
Status  -0.031  0.061  -0.51  0.613  -0.152   0.089    0.969  0.060 
Turnover  -0.000  0.000  -0.51  0.613  -0.000   0.000    1.000  0.000 
Inv. Capital  -0.000  0.000  -0.63  0.531  -0.000   0.000    1.000  0.000 
Fin. Lev.  -0.009  0.007  -1.26  0.208  -0.022   0.005    0.991  0.007 
Cash Disp.   0.141  0.125   1.13  0.260  -0.105   0.387    1.152  0.145 
Cash Ratio  -0.025  0.023  -1.08  0.280  -0.071   0.020    0.975  0.023 
ROE   0.002  0.017     0.11  0.914  -0.031   0.034    1.002  0.017 
ROCE  -0.022  0.027  -0.81  0.415  -0.076   0.031    0.978  0.027 
RPA  -0.001  0.000  -2.67  0.008  -0.001   0.000    0.999  0.000 
Veg. Surf.   0.000  0.000   5.00  0.000   0.000   0.000    1.000  0.000 
Irr. Surf.   0.000  0.000   3.54  0.000   0.000   0.000    1.000  0.000 
Nb. Veg.   0.048  0.011   4.55  0.000   0.028   0.069    1.050  0.011 
Bio. Agric.   0.029  0.092   0.31  0.757  -0.152   0.210    1.029  0.095 
Temp.   0.159  0.130   1.22  0.221  -0.095   0.414    1.172  0.152 
Precipit.   0.000  0.000   2.80  0.005   0.000   0.000    1.000  0.000 
Sunlight   0.000  0.000   1.68  0.094  -0.000   0.000    1.000  0.000 
Education1  -0.046  0.136  -0.34  0.732  -0.312   0.219    0.955  0.129 
Education2  -0.056  0.131  -0.43  0.668  -0.314   0.201    0.945  0.124 
Education3  -0.255  0.149  -1.72  0.086  -0.547   0.036    0.775  0.115 
Education4   0.181  0.225   0.80  0.421  -0.260   0.623    1.199  0.270 
Otex   0.514  0.061   8.36  0.000   0.393   0.634    1.672  0.103 
Alti2   0.210  0.081   2.57  0.010   0.050   0.369    1.233  0.100 
Alti3  -0.296  0.127  -2.33  0.020  -0.545  -0.047    0.744  0.095 
Intercept  -2.575  0.275  -9.36  0.000  -3.114  -2.035  –  – 
 
Number of observations  14100
LR: chi2 (25)  9892.59
Prob > chi2  0.0000





Legend of the variables: Indem. -1 = Amount of crop insurance indemnities the year before (€), Insured -1 = Indicator 
whether the farm was insured the year before, Age = Age of the farmer (years), Sex = Sex (0 = Woman, 1 = Man), 
Status = Status of the farm (1 = Farm belonging to an association), Turnover = Turnover (€), Inv. Capital = Invested 
Capital (€), Fin. Lev. = Financial Leverage,  Cash Disp. = Cash disposals, Cash Ratio, ROE = Return on Equity, ROCE 
= Return On Capital Employed, RPA = Revenue per are (€ / are), Veg. Surf. = Cultivated surface of the farm (ares), Irr. 
Surf. = Irrigated surface of the farm (ares), Nb. Veg. = Number of varieties of cultivated crops, Bio. Agric. = Biologic 
agriculture (0 = No, 1 = Yes), Temp., Precipit. and Sunlight = Mean square variations of temperature, precipitations and 
sunlight, Education0 (reference) = No education, Education1 = Short education,  Education2 = High School Diploma, 
Education3 = University courses, Education4 = Master Degree, Otex = Specialization of the farm (0 = Animals, 1 = 
Vegetables/Crops), Alti1 (reference) = Altitude lower than 300m, Alti2 = Altitude between 300 and 600m and Alti3 = 
Altitude upper than 600m. 
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